Abstract. This paper explores logical properties of belief-revision-based bargaining solution. We first present a syntax-independent construction of bargaining solution based on prioritized belief revision. With the construction, the computation of bargaining solution can be converted to the calculation of maximal consistent hierarchy of prioritized belief sets. We prove that the syntax-independent solution of bargaining satisfies a set of desired logical properties for agreement function and negotiation function. Finally we show that the computational complexity of beliefrevision-based bargaining can be reduced to Δ 
Introduction
Much recent research has shown that belief revision is a successful tool in modeling logical reasoning in bargaining and negotiation [2, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16] . These studies have established a qualitative solution to bargaining problem, which differentiates them from the traditional game-theoretic solution [6, 11] . In [16] , Zhang et al. proposed an axiomatic system to specify the logical reasoning behind negotiation processes by introducing a set of AGM-like postulates [1] . In [4, 5] , Meyer et al. further explored the logical properties of these postulates and their relationships. In [16] , Zhang and Zhang proposed a computational model of negotiation based on Nebel's syntax-dependent belief base revision operation [8] and discussed its game-theoretic properties and computational properties. It was shown that the computational complexity of belief-revision-based negotiation can be Π on the assumption that bargaining inputs are logically closed 1 . We then shown that the computation of agreements can be reduced to the construction of maximal consistent hierarchies of negotiation items. Based on this result, we show that the new definition of bargaining solution satisfies most of desired logical properties of negotiation. Finally we present a completeness result on computational complexity of belief-revision-based bargaining solution, which shows that the decision problem of bargaining solution is Δ P 2 [O(log n)]-complete. This result significantly improves the result presented in [16] .
Similar to the work in [16] , we will restrict us to the bargaining situations within which only two agents are involved. We assume that each agent has a set of negotiation items, referred to as demand set, which is describable in a finite propositional language L. The language is that of classical propositional logic with an associated consequence operation Cn in the sense that Cn(X) = {ϕ : X ϕ}, where X is a set of sentences. A set K of sentences is logically closed or called a belief set
Suppose that X 1 and X 2 are the demand sets of two agents. To simplify exploration, we will use X −i to represent the other set among X 1 and X 2 if X i is one of them.
Prioritized Belief Revision
Suppose that K is a belief set and a pre-order 2 . We define recursively a hierarchy, {K k } +∞ k=1 , of K with respect to the ordering as follows:
where ϕ ≺ ψ denotes ϕ ψ and ψ ϕ. The intuition behind the construction is that each time collects all maximal elements and remove them from the current set.
We will write K ≤l to denote
The following lemma shows that the hierarchy can only be finite if satisfies the following logical constraint:
It is easy to see that such an order can induce an AGM epistemic entrenchment and vice versa [3] . Therefore such an ordering will be referred to as a epistemic entrenchment(EE) ordering. The following lemma is easy to verify and will be used intensively throughout the paper.
Lemma 1.
Let K be a belief set and a pre-order over K which satisfies (LC), then 1. for any l, K ≤l is a belief set.
There exists a number
Let O be any set of sentences in L, we define the degree of coverage of O over K, denoted by ρ K (O), to be the greatest number l that satisfies K ≤l ⊆ O. It is well-known that an AGM belief revision operator can be uniquely determined by an epistemic entrenchment ordering. Similar to [16] , we will define a belief revision function based on the idea of maximizing retainment of most entrenched beliefs.
By following the convention introduced by Nebel [8] , for any belief set K, a set of sentences F , and an EE ordering over K, we define K ⇓ F as follows:
We call ⊗ a prioritized revision function over (K, ) if it is defined as follows:
Lemma 2. [Nebel 1992 ] ⊗ satisfies all AGM postulates.
Belief-Revision-Based Bargaining Solution
Now we redefine the bargaining solution given in [16] . Different from their work, we will define a bargaining game as a pair of prioritized belief sets rather than a pair of prioritized belief bases. We will see that this change results a significant differences in logical properties.
Definition 1. A bargaining game is a pair of prioritized belief sets
The definition of deals remains the same as in [16] .
satisfying the following two conditions: for each i = 1, 2,
The set of all deals of B is denoted by Ω(B).
We remark that since K 1 and K 2 are belief sets, it is easy to prove that for any deal (D 1 , D 2 ), both D 1 and D 2 are logically closed. This property will play a key role in the proofs of theorems in Section 4.
Definition 3. For any bargaining game
where
It is easy to see that γ(B) represents the subset of Ω(B) that contains the deals with the highest degree of coverage over all deals in Ω(B).
The min-max construction of the core captures the idea that the final agreement should maximally and evenly satisfy both agents's demands(see [16] ). Now we can finalize the reconstruction of bargaining solution.
Definition 4. A bargaining solution is a function A which maps a bargaining game to a set of sentences (agreement), defined as follows. For each bargaining game
where (Φ 1 , Φ 2 ) is the core of B and ⊗ i is the prioritized revision function over
We call A(B) (sometimes we write it as A(K 1 , K 2 )) an agreement function. It is easy to see that the outcomes of an agreement function do not depend on the syntax of its inputs. However, if the bargaining solution defined in [16] takes belief sets as inputs, it will give exactly the same outcomes as the above definition.
In such a sense, the logical properties we discuss in the following section can be viewed as the idealized properties of the bargaining solution defined in [16] .
Logical Properties of Bargaining Solution
In this section, we will present a set of logical properties of the bargaining solution we introduced in the previous section. We will show that the solution satisfies most desired properties for agreement functions and negotiation functions. To establish these properties, we need a few technical lemmas. Note that none of the lemmas holds without the assumption of the logical closeness of belief sets.
Lemma 3. Given a bargaining game
is consistent} and
Proof. Before we prove the main result of the lemma, we first show that
According to the definition of degree of coverage of a deal, K
. Therefore we will assume that K 1 ∪ K 2 is inconsistent. We only prove
The second component is similar.
For 
where ⊗ i is the prioritized revision function over (K i , i ).
Proof. We only present the proof for the first statement. The second one is similar.
First it is easy to prove that
On the other hand, according to Lemma 3, we have
. In addition, it is easy to prove that Ψ 1 ⊆ K 1 ⊗ 1 Ψ 2 . By AGM postulates again, we have 
is consistent},
, where π
is consistent}. Then
where ⊗ i is the prioritized selection revision over (K i , i ).
Proof. We only present the proof for the first statement. The second one is similar. According to Lemma 4, are logically closed). Now we can come to the conclusion that
In fact, by the construction of prioritized belief revision, we can easily verify that
To prove the other direction of inclusion, we assume that
and H is logically closed, we have ϕ ∈ H, which contradicts the consistency of H ∪ Ψ 2 . Therefore
Having the above lemmas, the verification of the following theorems becomes much easier. The first theorem shows that the calculation of agreement function can be transferred to the calculation of maximal consistent hierarchies of two belief sets.
Theorem 1. For any bargaining game B = ((K
where Ψ 1 , Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ 2 are defined as Lemma 5.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 5. ¶
We remark that the computation of Ψ 1 , Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ 2 has much less cost than the calculation of the core of a game. This explains why we could reduce the computational complexity of bargaining solution significantly (see Section 5 ).
The following theorem shows the basic logical properties of agreement function. 2 ) ), the following properties hold:
Theorem 2. Let A is a bargaining solution. For any bargaining game
Given Theorem 1, the verification of the above properties is trivial. One may notice that the above properties are similar to the postulates introduced in [4] for negotiation outcomes. In fact, our agreement function satisfies all the postulates for negotiation outcomes except
The following is a counterexample.
q}). Obviously (O4) does not hold for this example.
The reason that both agents give up their common demand r is the following. If an agent demands ¬p or ¬q, the agent needs to commit herself to accept its logical consequence ¬p ∨ ¬r or ¬q ∨ ¬r, respectively. Since r is less entrenched than the commitment by both agents, they have to give up r in order to reach the agreement Cn({p, q}) . If the agents do not mean that, it should be explicitly expressed in the initial demands.
The following theorem shows that with our construction of bargaining solution, we can define a negotiation function which is similar to the negotiation function introduced by Zhang et al. in [14] .
Theorem 3.
Let N be a function defined as follows:
where (Φ 1 , Φ 2 ) is the core of the bargaining game B = ((K 1 , 1 ), (K 2 , 2 )). Then N has the following properties (N i is the i-th component of N ):
Proof. The proof of (N1)-(N4) is trivial by Theorem 1. For (N5), since
We can see that the properties of Closure, Inclusion, Vacuity and Consistent are exactly the same as the corresponding postulates in [14] . The postulate Extensionality is trivially true for our definition. The postulates Inconsistency and Iteration are not applicable in our case because we do not consider inconsistent inputs and iteration operations. The following example illustrates that the postulate No Recantation is invalid for our definition of negotiation function.
As a weak version of No Recantation the property of Safe Expansion says that if an agent initiatively gives up all the demands which conflicts to the other agent, the other agent should accept all the consistent demands from the first agent.
Computational Complexity
In [16] , Zhang and Zhang shows that the complexity of belief-revision-based bargaining solutions is Π [16] .
In this section, we will show that the complexity can be reduced if we use the syntax-independent construction of agreement function.
We assume that readers are familiar with the complexity classes of P, NP,
, and these inclusions are generally believed to be proper (readers may refer to [10] for further details).
Given a bargaining game B = ((K 1 , 1 ), (K 2 , 2 )), since K 1 and K 2 are logically closed, they are infinite sets even though the language we consider is finite. To make computation possible, we assume that equivalent statements are represented by only one sentence, so a belief set can be finite 3 . In such a sense, we will refer a bargaining game B to a pair of prioritized belief sets, ((X 1 , 1 ), (X 2 , 2 )), where X i is finite sets of sentences and i is a pre-order over X i which satisfies logic constraint (LC). According to Lemma 1, for each i = 1, 2, we can always write
Therefore, for the convenience of our complexity analysis, in the rest of this section, we will specify a bargaining game as B = (X 1 , X 2 ), where
are the partitions of X 1 and X 2 respectively and satisfy the property mentioned above. According to Theorem 1, we can define an agreement function by Equation (2) as
Theorem 5. Let B = (X 1 , X 2 ) be a bargaining game and ϕ a formula. Deciding whether
Proof. Membership proof. Let B = (X 1 , X 2 ), where
Firstly, we can find a maximal k with a binary search such that if
2 is no longer consistent. Obviously, we will need O(log n) times search. Secondly, we fix
, and find a maximal p such that
is not inconsistent. Note that we should have k ≤ p. Also, this can be done with a binary search in time O(log n). In a similar way, we can fix
is not consistent. So we can compute A(B) using a deterministic Turing machine with O(log n) queries to an NP oracle. Finally, we check the consistency of A(B) ∪ {¬ϕ} with one query to an NP oracle. So the problem is in Δ
Hardness proof. By restrict B = (X 1 , X 2 ) where X 1 = {ϕ 1 } ∪ · · · ∪ {ϕ n } and X 2 = {ψ}. Then it is easy to see that our bargaining problem is identical to the cut base revision, which implies that deciding whether A(B) ϕ is Δ P 2 [O(log n)]-hard [7] . ¶
The following result shows that if we restricts the language to be Horn clauses, the decision problem of bargaining solution is tractable. 
Conclusion and Related Work
In this paper, we have presented a set of logical properties of belief-revision-based bargaining solution. By representing bargaining game as a pair of prioritized belief sets, the computation of bargaining solution can be converted to the construction of maximal consistent hierarchy of two agents' belief sets. Based on the result, we have shown that the agreement function and negotiation function defined by the bargaining solution satisfies most of postulates introduced in the literature. Our complexity analysis indicates that in general the computation of belief-revisionbased bargaining solution can be reduced or be approximated to Δ
This work is closed related to [16] . In fact, we can view the syntax-independent bargaining solution is a special case of syntax-dependent bargaining solution when bargaining games consists of belief sets. Although the assumption of logical closeness is just an idealized case, it is essential to disclose the logical properties behind the negotiation reasoning. We have shown that our solution to negotiation problem is different from the axiomatic approaches [4, 5, 14] . Since these formalisms are all based on the assumption of logical closeness, it is possible to apply our approach to develop a concrete construction for their negotiation functions.
